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Institutional Holdings and Analysts’ Stock Recommendations 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Prior studies document that institutional investors outperform the market. We investigate 
whether this superior performance is partly derived from institutional investors’ use of sell-side 
analysts’ stock recommendations. First, we find that the quarterly change in institutional 
ownership is positively correlated with consensus recommendations. After controlling for other 
determinants of institutional holdings, the quarterly change in institutional ownership is on 
average 0.90% higher for firms with favorable recommendations than for those with unfavorable 
recommendations. Second, using large trades to proxy for institutional trading, we find that there 
are more buyer-initiated than seller-initiated large trades around favorable recommendations and 
vice versa for unfavorable recommendations. Lastly, we find that the change in institutional 
ownership that is explained by stock recommendations is associated with positive abnormal 
returns in the future, about 4.2% per year. Overall, these results indicate that institutional 
investors trade upon stock recommendations and such trading contributes to their superior 
performance.  
 
 
Key Words: Financial analysts, institutional trading, stock recommendations. 
JEL Classification: G11, G14, G2, M4. 
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1. Introduction 
Institutional investors are regarded as sophisticated investors in the capital markets. Prior 
research has studied the trading behavior of institutional investors and documented their superior 
performance relative to benchmarks. However, there is no evidence on whether or not this 
performance is partly derived from sell-side analysts’ stock recommendations. In this paper, we 
fill the gap by investigating whether institutional investors trade upon analysts’ stock 
recommendations, and if so, whether such trading contributes to their superior performance. 
Whether institutional investors have the ability to identify mispriced stocks and outperform 
the market has been widely studied in the literature. Prior studies have documented a positive 
association between changes in institutional ownership and contemporaneous stock returns 
(Lakonishock et al. [1992]; Wermers [1999]; Nofsinger and Sias [1999]). This association is 
consistent with the superior performance of institutional investors and/or momentum trading by 
institutional investors. Recent studies (e.g., Gompers and Metrick [2001]; Sias et al. [2001]) find 
that institutional trading leads subsequent stock price changes, that is, stocks purchased (sold) by 
institutional investors outperform (underperform) benchmarks.  
While prior studies examine various sources of this superior performance, an omission is 
sell-side financial analysts’ stock recommendations.1 Prior research (e.g., Womack [1996]; 
Barber et al. [2001]) finds that favorable (unfavorable) recommendations are associated with 
positive (negative) abnormal returns. Institutional investors have timely access to stock 
recommendations through soft-dollar arrangements – arrangements under which institutional 
investors exchange additional commissions for research, either directly from brokerage houses or 
indirectly from research intermediaries such as First Call. Given the investment value of 
recommendations and institutional investors’ timely access to them, we expect institutional 
investors to trade upon stock recommendations: to increase holdings of firms with favorable 
                                                 
1 For example, Wermers (1999) studies whether institutional investors’ herding contributes to their superior 
performance, and Chen et al. (2000) examine whether momentum trading explains institutional investors’ 
superior performance.  
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recommendations and to decrease holdings of firms with unfavorable recommendations. 
We test this prediction using two complementary sets of analyses: quarterly and intraday. 
In the quarterly analysis, we examine the quarterly change in institutional ownership for firms 
with different types of consensus recommendations. In the intraday analysis, we examine the 
abnormal order imbalance (i.e., buyer-initiated minus seller-initiated) of large trades (proxy for 
institutional trading) around the release of recommendations. The two analyses complement each 
other in the sense that the quarterly analysis yields estimates of the quantitative impact of 
recommendations, while the intraday analysis provides cleaner tests by focusing on short trading 
intervals surrounding recommendations without confounding events. Consistent results from the 
two analyses can strengthen our inferences.  
The empirical evidence is consistent with our prediction. In the quarterly analysis, we find 
that, relative to firms without recommendations, the quarterly change in institutional ownership is 
on average 0.51% for firms with favorable recommendations and -0.39% for firms with 
unfavorable recommendations, after controlling for other determinants of institutional holdings.2 
Both are significantly different from the change in institutional ownership for firms with neutral 
recommendations, which is insignificantly different from zero.  
The impact of recommendations on institutional trading is economically significant as well. 
Along with stock returns, stock recommendations are among the most important determinants of 
institutional trading. The 0.90% difference in institutional trading between firms with favorable 
versus unfavorable recommendations is about one-fourth of the inter-quartile range of the 
quarterly change in institutional ownership. In terms of dollar value, institutional investors 
increase their holdings of firms with favorable recommendations by approximately $12 billion in 
a quarter relative to firms with unfavorable recommendations, based on our sample distribution of 
market value and stock recommendations.  
                                                 
2 As discussed later, the comparisons are between firms within a quarter and thus are not affected by the 
increasing trend of institutional ownership over time.  
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An alternative explanation for our findings is that analysts issue favorable (unfavorable) 
recommendations for a firm after observing that institutional investors buy (sell) shares of the 
firm. To investigate the validity of this argument, we examine the association between stock 
recommendations and future institutional trading. If stock recommendations induce institutional 
investors to trade, institutional investors might reverse their investments after stock prices have 
fully reflected information in these recommendations. This is indeed the case: stock 
recommendations are negatively correlated with changes in institutional holdings in the future. In 
contrast, we do not expect this negative association under the alternative explanation. Therefore, 
our evidence is unlikely to be driven by analysts learning from institutional trading. 
In the intraday analysis, we find that there are more buyer-initiated than seller-initiated 
large trades around “Strong Buy” and more seller-initiated than buyer-initiated large trades 
around “Hold,” “Sell,” or “Strong Sell.” The abnormal order imbalance is also significantly 
different between “Strong Buy” (“Hold/Sell/Strong Sell”) and “Buy” in the predicted directions 
in the trading day around recommendations. The results are robust to controlling for other 
determinants of institutional trading and are similar if we focus on medium trades, which some 
researchers argue is a better proxy for institutional trading (Barclay et al. [1993]; Chakravarty 
[2001]).  
Lastly, we directly investigate whether institutional trading in response to stock 
recommendations partly explains institutional investors’ superior performance. We find that 
institutional trading that is explained by stock recommendations is positively correlated with 
future stock returns, after controlling for other determinants of institutional trading and risk 
factors. Forming portfolios based on this measure, we find that firms in the top decile outperform 
those in the bottom decile by 1.05% in the next quarter, an annualized return of 4.20%. This is 
consistent with recommendations contributing to institutional investors’ superior performance. 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it presents systematic 
evidence that institutional investors trade in response to stock recommendations and that such 
 4
trading contributes to institutional investors outperforming individual investors. We also find that 
stock recommendations are among the most important factors that explain institutional investors’ 
trading and performance, suggesting that future research on institutional trading should consider 
the impact of stock recommendations. 
Second, this paper contributes to our understanding of the market for analyst research. 
While prior studies have examined the properties of analyst research, there is little systematic 
evidence on who uses that research or how analyst research becomes incorporated into market 
prices. Our results suggest that information in stock recommendations is incorporated into stock 
prices, at least partially, through institutional trading.  
Lastly, our evidence has implications for the effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD). An 
underlying premise of Regulation FD is that when managers selectively disclose information to 
financial analysts, some investors can use the information in their trading, while others cannot. 
Consistent with this premise, we find that institutional investors trade using analyst 
recommendations and thus are more likely to benefit from the information disclosed by managers 
than individual investors.3 Hence, if successfully enforced, Regulation FD could reduce 
institutional investors’ information advantage over individual investors. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our hypothesis and 
explains the research design. Section 3 discusses data and control variables for the quarterly 
analysis. Section 4 presents the quarterly analysis and Section 5 presents the intraday analysis. 
Section 6 examines the link between stock recommendations and institutional investors’ superior 
performance. Section 7 presents conclusions. 
 
2. Hypothesis Development and Research Design 
A robust finding in the institutional trading literature is the positive correlation between 
                                                 
3 This is consistent with the survey evidence presented in Boni and Womack (2002), who find that what 
institutional investors value the most is the information financial analysts obtain from firm management. 
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changes in institutional ownership and stock returns over the same period. Recent studies find 
that this correlation is partly due to institutional investors’ superior performance relative to the 
market. For example, using a covariance decomposition method, Sias et al. (2001) conclude that 
the correlation is driven by information revelation of institutional trading. That is, institutional 
investors are better informed than individual investors and hence institutional trading leads price 
changes. Their finding is confirmed by the intraday evidence presented in Chan and Lakonishok 
(1993) and Chakravarty (2001). 
Many studies document that institutional trading leads stock returns. For example, 
Gompers and Metrick (2001) find that the level of institutional ownership in a stock can help to 
forecast its future return. Nofsinger and Sias (1999) find that firms with the largest increases in 
institutional ownership outperform firms with the largest decreases in institutional ownership by 
5.43% in the following year. Chen et al. (2000) find that the stocks fund managers buy 
outperform those they sell by 2% per year after controlling for various characteristics. Confirming 
these results from a different perspective, Odean (1999) finds that stocks purchased by individual 
investors consistently underperform the stocks they sell.  
Prior research has examined various sources of institutional investors’ superior 
performance, including herding (Wermers [1999]) and momentum trading strategies (Chen et al. 
[2000]). However, one factor that has not been studied is sell-side analysts’ stock 
recommendations. Because stock recommendations have investment value and institutional 
investors have timely access to them, recommendations can be a potential driver of institutional 
investors’ superior performance.  
The investment value of stock recommendations has been well documented in the 
literature. For example, Womack (1996) analyzes 1,573 recommendations in 1989-1991 and finds 
that the average three-day abnormal returns are 3.0% for upgrades and -4.7% for downgrades. He 
also documents a post-recommendation drift, 2.4% for upgrades and -9.1% for downgrades. 
These findings are confirmed by later studies with more recent and larger recommendation 
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samples, such as Juergens (1999) and Barber et al. (2001). Furthermore, the price movements do 
not reverse in the future, suggesting that recommendations contain valuable information.  
Institutional investors have timely access to sell-side analysts through soft-dollar 
arrangements, a mechanism through which institutional investors exchange commissions for 
research from brokerage houses.4 Soft-dollar arrangements are prevalent and costly to 
institutional investors. Based on a survey conducted by Greenwich Associates in 1996, the SEC 
(1998) reports that almost all institutional investors use soft-dollar arrangements to obtain 
research and that trade commissions involving soft-dollar arrangements comprise 27% of the total 
trade commissions. Conrad et al. (2001) find that the incremental execution costs under soft-
dollar arrangements are substantial: about 0.29% (0.24%) of the transaction value for buy (sell) 
orders.  
Institutional investors are willing to bear this cost only if the benefits of receiving timely 
research exceed such costs (Grossman and Stiglitz [1980]). Since favorable (unfavorable) 
recommendations are associated with positive (negative) abnormal returns, we hypothesize as 
follows:  
H1: Institutional investors increase holdings of firms with favorable recommendations and 
decrease holdings of firms with unfavorable recommendations.  
 To test this hypothesis, we conduct two sets of analyses: quarterly and intraday. In the 
quarterly analysis, we examine whether the quarterly change in institutional ownership is 
positively associated with consensus stock recommendations. We take special care to address 
concerns that the association might be driven by (a) other investment signals or (b) analysts 
learning from institutional trading. To address (a), we control for a comprehensive set of 
investment signals that might affect institutional holdings, including institutional preferences, 
                                                 
4 Blume (1993) and SEC (1998) describe the history of soft-dollar arrangements. Soft-dollar arrangements 
developed in the 1950s, when trade commission rates were fixed above the competitive level and brokers 
competed for orders by offering additional services, including research. Congress abolished fixed 
commission rates in 1975, but legitimized soft-dollar arrangements via the “safe harbor” provisions.  
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momentum trading, herding, and value/glamour trading. To address (b), we investigate the 
association between stock recommendations and future changes in institutional ownership. In the 
intraday analysis, we examine abnormal trade imbalances in the three days surrounding stock 
recommendations. Intraday analysis is conducted on a subset of recommendations without 
confounding events and examines trades in half-hour intervals around the release of 
recommendations. We expect to find more buyer-initiated institutional trades around favorable 
recommendations and more seller-initiated institutional trades around unfavorable 
recommendations.  
We use these two sets of complementary analyses to strengthen our inferences. The 
quarterly analysis is an indirect test but it can provide quantitative estimates of the impact of 
recommendations on institutional holdings and help assess the economic significance of this 
impact. On the other hand, the intraday analysis is less likely to be subject to the two confounding 
effects mentioned above, and it provides cleaner and more direct tests of our hypothesis. 
However, the economic significance is more difficult to assess based on the intraday analysis.  
If institutional investors trade upon stock recommendations as hypothesized, such trading 
might help explain their above-average performance. We directly test this by examining the 
association between institutional trading attributed to recommendations and future abnormal 
returns. A positive association, after controlling for other drivers of institutional performance, 
indicates that institutional investors’ superior performance is partly derived from their use of 
recommendations.  
 
3. Data and Control Variables for Quarterly Analysis 
This section describes data and variables used in the quarterly analysis. The data used in the 
intraday analysis will be discussed in Section 5. 
3.1 Data 
The sample period, limited by the time span of our stock recommendation dataset, is from 
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the first quarter of 1994 to the second quarter of 1999. We include all firm-quarters with data on 
changes in institutional holdings. We also require the availability of financial and stock return 
data from Compustat and CRSP to calculate control variables (to be described later). The final 
sample includes 67,230 firm-quarters.  
3.1.1 Institutional Holdings 
Institutional holding data were obtained from CDA/Spectrum. The SEC requires all 
institutional investors with equity security assets of $100 million or more to use Form 13F to 
report their holdings quarterly. For each firm-quarter, institutional ownership is calculated as the 
proportion of the firm’s outstanding shares held by all reporting institutional investors as at the 
end of the quarter.5, 6 We use quarterly change in institutional ownership to proxy for net 
institutional trading in the quarter.  
Panel A of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for institutional holdings and trading.7 The 
average institutional ownership is 41%. The average quarterly change in institutional ownership 
is 0.23%, suggesting an upward trend. This overall trend does not affect our empirical analyses 
since we compare changes in institutional ownership of firms with different recommendations 
(favorable, neutral, unfavorable, no recommendations) within a quarter.  
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
3.1.2 Stock Recommendations 
Stock recommendations were obtained from First Call. First Call collects stock 
                                                 
5 About 94% of institutional investors file 13F in a timely fashion and report the quarter-ends as the filing 
dates. For late-filing institutional investors, CDA/Spectrum adjusts their reported holdings for stock 
splits/dividends that occur between the quarter-ends and the filing dates. We noticed occasional 
mismatches between the reported holdings and the shares outstanding at the filing dates for both on-time-
filing and late-filing institutional investors, when stock splits/dividends happen after and close to the 
quarter-ends. These mismatches result in measurement errors in institutional ownership. Our inferences 
remain unchanged if we exclude firm-quarters with stock splits/dividends over the next year.  
6 We exclude holdings of institutional investors who do not report holdings in any firm in the previous or 
the following quarter. Infrequent reporting might indicate inconsistent reporting practices, introducing 
noise to the institutional ownership variable. Less than 1% of the firm-quarters are excluded as a result of 
this restriction. 
7 To minimize the influence of extreme values, we winsorize institutional holdings and trading at the 1st and 
99th percentiles. Our inspection of the data suggests that most of the extreme values result from reporting 
errors. We also winsorize control variables. The results without winsorizing are qualitatively similar.  
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recommendations from a majority of U.S. and international brokerage houses and classifies them 
into five categories: “Strong Buy,” “Buy,” “Hold,” “Sell,” and “Strong Sell.” In total, there are 
151,848 stock recommendations over the sample period for firms in our sample. 
We re-examine the effect of recommendations on stock returns because it underlies our 
hypothesis and our sample is significantly different from the samples in the prior studies.8 It is 
necessary that stock recommendations predict stock returns if recommendations are to have any 
effect on institutional holdings, assuming that institutional investors are profit maximizing. Using 
a research methodology similar to that in prior research, Appendix A reports the mean abnormal 
returns in the three-day window around stock recommendations ([-1,+1]) and in the six months 
afterwards for our sample of recommendations.  
Two main points emerge from Appendix A. First, in the three-day window, “Strong Buy” 
is associated with significantly positive abnormal returns (1.18%) and “Hold,” “Sell,” and 
“Strong Sell” are associated with significantly negative abnormal returns (-1.54%, -1.07%, and  
-1.46%, respectively). While “Buy” is associated with significantly positive abnormal returns, the 
magnitude, 0.12%, is small, suggesting that “Buy” is perceived as close to neutral 
recommendations. In the six months afterwards, stock recommendations are generally associated 
with abnormal returns of the same signs as in the three-day window. These returns become 
insignificant starting the second month, except for “Sell” and “Strong Sell” whose abnormal 
returns display a longer drift.9 Second, “Sell” and “Strong Sell” comprise only 3.8% of the 
                                                 
8 The sample in Womack (1996), 1,573 recommendations in the period 1989-1991 from First Call, is much 
smaller than ours; Barber et al. (2001) obtain recommendations from Zacks, which has less accurate 
recommendation dates than First Call and omits recommendations from some large brokerage houses, such 
as Merrill Lynch and Goldman Sachs.  
9 The abnormal returns after the first six months (not reported) are insignificant, suggesting that stock 
recommendations are not associated with future return reversals and are thus not self-fulfilling prophecies. 
 10
recommendations and have similar returns as “Hold.” Therefore, in the subsequent analyses, we 
combine “Hold,” “Sell,” and “Strong Sell” together as unfavorable recommendations.10  
To measure the consensus recommendation for a firm-quarter, we first denote “Strong 
Buy,” “Buy,” “Hold/Sell/Strong Sell” as 5, 4, and 3 and then take the average of 
recommendations issued in the firm-quarter.11 As reported in Panel B of Table 1, consensus 
recommendations (REC) are available for 44,675 firm-quarters, roughly two-thirds of the sample. 
The mean of consensus recommendations is close to 4 (equivalent to “Buy”).12 For the quarterly 
analysis, we construct three indicator variables, D_SBuy, D_Buy, and D_Sell, to represent 
favorable, neutral, and unfavorable recommendations, respectively. D_SBuy is 1 if REC falls into 
the top 33% in the current quarter; D_Buy is 1 if REC falls into the middle 33%; and D_Sell is 1 
if REC falls into the bottom 34%. 
3.2 Control Variables 
One concern with analyzing the contemporaneous relation between institutional trading and 
recommendations is that other investment signals might affect both measures. To address this 
concern, we control for a comprehensive set of factors that might affect institutional holdings and 
stock recommendations. Relying on prior research, we identify 12 factors and organize them into 
four groups:  
Institutional preferences (5 factors). Bennett et al. (2003) summarize four stock 
characteristics that affect institutional preferences as measured by nine proxies: risk (beta, return 
volatility, and firm-specific risk), investment constraints (firm size, firm age, and dividend yield), 
                                                 
10 This characterization is also consistent with practitioners’ perception: “the ‘Hold’ category – that’s Wall 
Street code for ‘Sell’ (Benson and Bryan-Low [2002]),” in particular with institutional investors’ 
perception (Boni and Womack [2002]).  
11 Unlike the consensus recommendation measure provided by First Call, our consensus recommendation 
does not include stale recommendations. When calculating consensus recommendations, First Call uses the 
outstanding recommendations of all the analysts; some of the recommendations may have been issued a 
long time ago and are no longer relevant to institutional investors’ trading decisions. In contrast, we only 
include the recommendations issued in the current quarter.  
12 Having a “Buy” recommendation on average is consistent with prior evidence that analysts’ stock 
recommendations are upward biased. Appendix A indicates that “Buy” is interpreted as a neutral 
recommendation by the capital market: it is not associated with economically significant positive abnormal 
returns. 
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liquidity (share price and share turnover), and return momentum (past stock returns). We include 
changes in five of the nine variables (beta, return volatility, firm-specific risk, dividend yield, and 
share turnover) as control variables. We do not include change in firm age because it is constant. 
Changes in firm size (proxied by market value of equity) and share price are essentially stock 
returns, which are separately discussed below, along with past returns, as momentum factors. 
Momentum trading (3 factors). Recent empirical work finds that both institutional investors 
and financial analysts prefer stocks with positive momentum (Grinblatt et al. [1995]; Jegadeesh et 
al. [2004]). We include contemporaneous and lagged quarterly stock returns to control for return 
momentum (i.e., returns in quarter t and quarter t-1) and contemporaneous earnings forecast 
revisions to control for earnings momentum.  
Herding (1 factor). Herding refers to institutional investors following past trading patterns. 
Sias (2004) finds evidence consistent with such herding. Since institutional trading is informative 
of future stock returns (Chen et al. [2002]), analysts can extract information from institutional 
trading. We include the change in institutional ownership in the previous quarter to control for 
herding and analysts learning from institutional trades.  
Value/Glamour trading (3 factors). Prior research suggests that institutional investors 
prefer firms with certain value/glamour characteristics and analysts are more likely to issue 
favorable recommendations for glamour stocks than for value stocks (Jegadeesh et al. [2004]). 
Accordingly, we control for current earnings-to-price ratio (EP), book-to-price ratio (BP), and 
sales growth. (Firm-quarters with negative EP or BP are excluded from the analyses.) 
The measurement of control variables follows that of prior research and is summarized in 
Panel C of Table 1. Panel C also reports descriptive statistics for these variables. On average, 
changes in beta, return volatility, firm-specific risk, dividend yield, and share turnover are close 
to zero. The mean quarterly market-adjusted return is 0.17%. The average earnings forecast 
revision (deflated by stock price) is -0.01, although both the 1st and 3rd quartiles are 0.00. EP 
averages 0.02, BP averages 0.59, and sales on average grow 20% annually.  
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Panel D of Table 1 presents the Pearson correlations between changes in institutional 
ownership, consensus recommendations, and control variables. The correlation between changes 
in institutional ownership and consensus recommendations is 0.13 and significantly positive, 
consistent with institutional ownership increasing with stock recommendations. Both changes in 
institutional ownership and consensus recommendations are generally correlated with control 
variables in the same directions, confirming the importance of controlling for these factors. It 
appears that institutional investors increase holdings of, and analysts issue more favorable 
recommendations for, firms with low risk, high liquidity, return momentum, earnings momentum, 
glamour characteristics, or strong institutional demand in the past. Also note that some 
correlations between control variables are quite high, such as that between change in return 
volatility and change in firm-specific risk (0.89). This may result in multicollinearity and is 
addressed in the next section.  
 
4. Quarterly Analysis 
In this section, we first report the main analysis of the association between the change in 
institutional ownership and the consensus recommendation. We then report the analysis that 
addresses the potential endogeneity of analysts learning from institutional trading. Lastly, we 
examine the robustness of the results by conducting various sensitivity tests and additional 
analyses (by institution type, firm size, and institution’s trading decision). For each test, we 
estimate quarterly regressions and report the average coefficients across quarters and the 
accompanying p-values based on time-series standard errors (Fama and MacBeth [1973]). This 
approach controls for potential cross-sectional correlations in error terms. To facilitate 
comparisons across explanatory variables, we standardize the control variables – subtracting the 
sample mean and dividing by the sample standard deviation within the quarter. Therefore, the 
coefficient on a control variable captures the change in institutional trading associated with one 
standard deviation’s change in the control variable.  
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4.1 Main Analysis 
To test our hypothesis, we regress the change in institutional ownership on the three 
recommendation indicators and the control variables:  
εβββ
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Firm subscript i and quarter subscript t are omitted for simplicity. β1,a (β1,b, β1,c) captures the 
impact of a favorable (neutral, unfavorable) recommendation on the change in a firm’s 
institutional ownership in a quarter. Our hypothesis predicts β1,a to be positive and β1,c to be 
negative. We do not have a prediction for the sign of β1,b as it is unclear how institutional 
investors should react to “Buy” recommendations, which are arguably neutral signals and 
associated with only small positive abnormal returns. However, we expect β1,a >β1,b > β1,c . 
The regression results are presented in Table 2. Panel A, Column (1) reports the regression 
results when control variables are not included. Consistent with our hypothesis, the coefficient on 
D_SBuy is significantly positive (0.0100, p=0.001) and that on D_Sell is significantly negative  
(-0.0063, p=0.001). (Throughout the paper, p-values are one-sided for coefficients with 
directional predictions and two-sided otherwise.) These coefficients correspond to an incremental 
quarterly change in institutional ownership of 1.00% and -0.63%, compared with firms without 
recommendations. The coefficient on D_Buy is also significantly positive (0.0018, p=0.068), but 
its magnitude is only one-fifth of that on D_SBuy. The formal tests reported in Panel B indicate 
that the differences in coefficients between D_SBuy and D_Buy, between D_Sell and D_Buy, and 
between D_SBuy and D_Sell are significant in the predicted directions at the 0.001 level. That is, 
relative to firms with neutral recommendations, firms with favorable (unfavorable) 
recommendations are associated with increased (decreased) institutional ownership. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
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Columns (2), (3), and (4) report the regression results after including control variables. 
Because change in return volatility and change in firm-specific risk are highly correlated (the 
Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.89, as reported in Panel D of Table 1), we include them 
separately in Columns (2) and (3). To ensure that the change in risk is fully controlled, we include 
both of them in Column (4). Because the results are similar across the three specifications, we 
focus our discussions on the full model (Column (4)) here and only report the full model results 
for subsequent tests.13 The coefficients on favorable and unfavorable recommendation indicators, 
although smaller in magnitude than those in Column (1), are highly significant in predicted 
directions: 0.0051 for D_SBuy and -0.0039 for D_Sell. 14 The coefficient on D_Buy is no longer 
significantly different from zero. Panel B shows that as expected, D_SBuy - D_Buy, D_Sell - 
D_Buy, and D_SBuy - D_Sell are significantly positive, negative, and positive, respectively.15 
The impact of stock recommendations is economically significant as well. Relative to a 
firm with unfavorable recommendations, a firm with favorable recommendations attracts an 
additional 0.90% of institutional ownership (0.0051-[-0.0039]) in a quarter. Given the total 
market value of around $4 trillion for firms with stock recommendations (quarterly average in our 
sample) and the proportion of firms with favorable and unfavorable recommendations (one third 
each in our sample), our finding implies an additional increase in institutional investment of about 
$12 billion (4,000×0.90%×1/3) in a quarter for firms with favorable recommendations relative to 
those with unfavorable recommendations. 
The results for control variables are consistent with prior studies. Institutional investors 
increase holdings of firms with lower return volatility, higher dividend yield, higher return, more 
earnings momentum, stronger prior institutional demand, lower EP, lower BP, or higher growth. 
                                                 
13 The condition index is lower than 10 for all regressions. Thus, multicollinearity is not a concern (Belsley 
et al. [1980]).  
14 The results are consistent over time: D_SBuy is positive and D_Sell is negative for all of the 22 quarters 
in our sample. 
15 To simplify the discussion here and later, we use D_SBuy - D_Buy, D_Sell - D_Buy, and D_SBuy - 
D_Sell to indicate the difference in coefficients between D_SBuy and D_Buy, between D_Sell and D_Buy, 
and between D_SBuy and D_Sell, respectively. 
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Comparing the coefficients on these control variables with those on the recommendation 
variables indicates that the impact of stock recommendations is comparable to that of the most 
important determinants of institutional trading; a one-standard-deviation increase in 
contemporaneous stock returns, lagged stock returns, change in return volatility is associated with 
quarterly changes in institutional ownership of 1.07%, 0.52%, -0.33%, respectively.  
4.2 Are the Results Driven by Analysts Learning from Institutional Trading? 
The positive contemporaneous association between institutional trading and 
recommendations is also consistent with analysts issuing recommendations in response to 
institutional trading. That is, analysts issue favorable (unfavorable) recommendations for a firm 
after they observe institutional investors purchasing (selling) shares of the firm. To differentiate 
our hypothesis from this alternative explanation, we investigate the relation between 
recommendations and future institutional trading. If institutional investors adjust their holdings in 
response to stock recommendations and such adjustments make institutional investors’ holdings 
deviate from the optimal position (e.g., from the perspective of risk diversification), institutional 
investors may reverse their investments after stock prices have fully reflected information in 
recommendations. Since stock recommendations are not associated with abnormal stock returns 
after about six months, as shown in Womack (1996) and Appendix A of this paper, institutional 
investors who trade on the basis of recommendations are expected to unwind the position to 
revert to their prior portfolio allocations. That is, our hypothesis implies a negative association 
between current recommendations and future institutional trading. In contrast, we do not expect 
this negative association under the alternative explanation.  
To examine the association between recommendations and future institutional trading, we 
add consensus recommendations in the past eight quarters to the right-hand side of regression (1). 
To simplify result presentations, we use one consensus recommendation variable rather than three 
recommendation indicators (the inferences are the same if we use indicators). The regression is as 
follows:  
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 (2) 
Firm subscript i and quarter subscript t are omitted from all the variables (except recommendation 
variables) for simplicity. Because it is unclear when institutional investors reverse their trading, 
we include lagged recommendations up to eight quarters to capture any potential reversal. 
Although we do not have directional predictions for the sign of each particular lagged 
recommendation, we expect the sum of their coefficients to be negative.  
Table 3 reports the regression results. Due to the requirements of additional 
recommendations, the sample is reduced to 11,371 firm-quarters covering the period from the 
first quarter of 1996 to the second quarter of 1999. The coefficient on current recommendation 
(0.0056) is significantly positive, as before. The recommendation coefficients are insignificant for 
lags one and two, significantly negative for lags three to six (-0.0014, -0.0020, -0.0012, and  
-0.0010, respectively), and insignificant again for lags seven and eight. The sum of the 
coefficients on all the lagged recommendations is significantly negative (p=0.001), as expected, 
and the sum of the coefficients on current and lagged recommendations is insignificantly different 
from zero. These results suggest that institutional investors completely unwind their positions 
within one and a half years after recommendations. Such evidence is inconsistent with the 
alternative explanation.16  
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
4.3 Sensitivity Tests 
To investigate whether our finding is robust, we conduct a series of sensitivity tests, namely 
adding additional control variables, adopting an alternative research design, and using alternative 
                                                 
16 We also use an instrumental variables approach to explicitly control for the endogeneity of issuing stock 
recommendations. We use the lagged recommendation as the instrumental variable and obtain similar 
results as in Section 4.1. 
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measures. We also report results that condition on institution type, firm size, and institution’s 
trading decision. Because institutional investors’ responses to investment signals may vary across 
settings, consistent results for stock recommendations in different settings will suggest that the 
results for recommendations are not driven by other investment signals. 
Additional controls. (1) Because changes in stock characteristics might measure 
unexpected changes with noise, we add contemporaneous levels of beta, return volatility, firm-
specific risk, dividend yield, and share turnover to regressions. (2) Institutional investors could 
respond to investment signals in the previous quarter if they do not learn about these signals in a 
timely fashion. Accordingly, we control for the lags of all the control variables. (3) We add 
market value, firm age, and stock price at the end of the current quarter to control for potential 
changes in institutional investors’ preferences over time. (4) We add earnings surprises 
(announced in the current quarter) to proxy for earnings momentum, analysts’ forecasts of long-
term growth rate (announced in the current quarter) to proxy for growth, and accruals and capital 
expenditures (summed over the previous four quarters, deflated by total assets) to proxy for 
accounting fundamentals. (5) Lastly, we add squares of all the control variables to control for 
potential nonlinearity of the association between institutional trading and control variables. In all 
these tests, the results for stock recommendations (not tabulated) remain similar to the main 
analysis: the difference in coefficients between D_SBuy (D_Sell) and D_Buy is significant at the 
0.001 level and ranges between 0.0044 and 0.0051 (between -0.0045 and -0.0038). 
Alternative research design – the matched-pairs approach. Within each quarter, we match 
a D_SBuy firm with a D_Sell firm that has similar values for the control variables. We then 
compare the average change in institutional ownership of the D_SBuy group with that of the 
matched D_Sell group: the difference is 0.0069 and significant at the 0.001 level. Since there are 
twelve dimensions to match on, this approach reduces the sample size by more than 90%. 
Accordingly, we do not use this approach in our main analysis. 
Alternative measures. We use an alternative measure of institutional trading – changes in 
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the number of institutional investors investing in the firm (Chen et al. [2002]) – and find similar 
results. We also use recommendation changes (i.e., upgrades, reiterations, and downgrades) 
instead of recommendation levels. The results are similar: institutions increase holdings of firms 
with upgrades and decrease holdings of firms with downgrades.  
Analysis by institution type 
CDA/Spectrum classifies institutional investors into five types: banks, insurance 
companies, investment companies (e.g., mutual funds), investment advisors (including most large 
brokerage houses), and other institutional investors (e.g., pension funds, university endowments). 
If all the types have timely access to stock recommendations, their trading should all vary with 
recommendations.  
Panel A of Table 4 reports the regression results from equation (1) for each institution type. 
For simplicity, we only report the differences across recommendations (i.e., D_SBuy - D_Buy, 
D_Sell - D_Buy, D_SBuy - D_Sell). The results indicate that D_SBuy - D_Buy is significantly 
positive, D_Sell - D_Buy is significantly negative, and D_SBuy - D_Sell is significantly positive 
for each type of institutional investor, consistent with all types of institutional investors trading 
upon stock recommendations.  
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
Analysis by firm size 
We split the sample into five groups based on the market value quintiles of all CRSP firms 
at the end of each quarter. Because institutional investors tend to invest more in large firms, there 
are fewer observations in the three groups of smaller firms. To increase the power of tests, we 
combine these three groups into one small-firm group of 24,688 firm-quarters. The medium- and 
large-firm groups have 17,272 and 25,270 firm-quarters, respectively.  
Panel B of Table 4 presents the differences in coefficients across recommendations. The 
differences are significant in the predicted directions for all the three groups, suggesting that the 
results hold for firms of different sizes.  
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Analysis by institution’s trading decision 
Changes in institutional ownership arise from three trading decisions: (1) entry of new 
institutional investors, (2) exit of old institutional investors, and (3) adjustment of existing 
holdings. Prior research finds that the effect of information differs across these decisions. In 
particular, Chan and Lakonishok (1993) find that institutional investors’ exit decisions are more 
likely to be driven by liquidity considerations than by information. To examine whether 
recommendations affect these decisions similarly, we decompose the change in institutional 
ownership into three components: entry, exit, and adjustment of existing holdings and then 
analyze them separately. To be consistent, the lagged change in institutional ownership on the 
right-hand side of regression (1) is decomposed similarly.  
The results, as reported in Panel C of Table 4, suggest that consensus recommendations 
significantly affect entry and adjustment in the predicted directions. The impact of 
recommendations on exit is less significant: while D_SBuy - D_Buy is significantly positive 
(p=0.057), D_Sell - D_Buy is insignificant (p=0.198). This evidence is consistent with Chan and 
Lakonishok’s finding that exit decisions are less likely to be driven by information.  
To summarize, these additional analyses suggest that the positive association between 
quarterly changes in institutional ownership and stock recommendations holds across different 
settings. Since certain investment signals affect institutional trading differently in different 
contexts, these consistent results further suggest that the association is not driven by other 
investment signals.17  
4.4 Summary of the Quarterly Analysis 
The quarterly analysis indicates that institutional investors increase their holdings of a firm 
upon favorable recommendations and decrease their holdings of a firm upon unfavorable 
                                                 
17 For example, untabulated results suggest that while banks, insurance companies, investment companies, 
and investment advisors follow a momentum strategy, other institutional investors follow a contrarian 
strategy; institutional investors follow a momentum strategy when they enter a firm but not when they 
adjust existing holdings.  
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recommendations. This inference is robust to other factors affecting institutional holdings and 
holds across different contexts. Further analyses indicate that institutional investors gradually 
reverse their trading after stock prices have incorporated information in stock recommendations. 
This result suggests that our finding is not driven by analysts learning from institutional trading.  
 
5. Intraday Analysis 
In the intraday analysis, we use large trades to proxy for institutional trading, as is common 
in the microstructure literature, and we test whether there are more buyer-initiated than seller-
initiated large trades around favorable recommendations and more seller-initiated than buyer-
initiated large trades around unfavorable recommendations. We proxy favorable 
recommendations with “Strong Buy” and unfavorable recommendations with “Hold/Sell/Strong 
Sell.” We do not have predictions for “Buy,” which are shown to be close to neutral 
recommendations.  
5.1 Data 
To reduce data processing, we focus on stock recommendations issued in 1997 and 1998. 
We impose various filters to ensure that the time stamps are accurate and there are no 
confounding events such as dividends or earnings announcements. Appendix B describes the 
sample selection process in detail. The final sample includes 4,322 recommendations for 1,597 
firms.  
These recommendations are representative of the full sample analyzed in Section 4 except 
that “Buy” appears to be more favorable in this intraday sample than in the full sample. As 
reported in Appendix A, the average three-day abnormal return associated with “Buy” in the full 
sample is 0.12%, but it is 0.35% in the intraday sample, almost three times as large. The abnormal 
returns associated with “Strong Buy” or “Hold/Sell/Strong Sell” are similar between the intraday 
sample and the full sample. The distribution of recommendations across categories in the intraday 
sample, 36% “Strong Buy,” 30% “Buy,” 34% “Hold/Sell/Strong Sell,” is similar to the full 
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sample. There is no concentration of recommendations in specific months. Slightly more 
recommendations are disclosed in the morning than later in the day (about 54% of the 
recommendations are in the period 9:30 A.M. – 12:00 P.M.) 
The classification of large trades is based on a modified trade-value-based classification 
method, as in Lee (1992).18 We first obtain the average trading price of a firm during the sample 
period and then determine the largest number of round lot shares with a trade value (based on the 
average trading price) less than or equal to $10,000. Trades above this cutoff are classified as 
large trades. In our sample, 58% of trades are classified as large trades, over 95% of which have 
trade value greater than $10,000. We choose this threshold based on the 2000 NYSE 
Shareownership Report and the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances (the median household stock 
portfolio size was $28,000 in 1998). Two other thresholds ($20,000 and $30,000) are used in 
sensitivity tests and yield similar results. We also use a classification method allowing medium 
trades, which may be a better proxy for informed institutional trading. Barclay et al. (1993) find 
that medium trades have a disproportionate impact on stock prices, and Chakravarty (2001) finds 
that medium trades by institutional investors move prices. Thus, we classify trades into small 
(less than 500 shares), medium (500 to 10,000 shares), and large (more than 10,000 shares). The 
results for medium trades are similar to those reported below. 
We use the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm to infer trade direction. If the trading price is 
lower (higher) than the midpoint of the quote, the trade is classified as seller-initiated (buyer-
initiated). The current quote is used if it is at least 5 seconds old. If not, the latest quote at least 5 
seconds before the trade is used. The median age of quotes used is 24 seconds. The Lee and 
Ready algorithm uses the tick method to classify trades with a trading price at the midpoint of the 
quote. However, Odders-White (2000) finds that its accuracy is low and suggests that future 
research eliminate midpoint trades. We follow her suggestion and do not classify these trades. In 
                                                 
18 While classifying trades based on the number of shares alone ignores differences in stock prices across 
firms, classifying trades based on trade value alone is sensitive to small price movements and thus 
problematic to implement, given the discrete trade size (in round lots of 100 shares).  
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our sample, 45% of trades are classified as buyer-initiated, 39% are classified as seller-initiated, 
and 16% are not classified. 
The estimation of abnormal order imbalance follows Lee (1992). First, we compute a 
frequency-based direction measure for each half-hour interval in the three trading days 
surrounding a recommendation (-13 to +25 half-hour intervals, that is, from one day prior to two 
days after) by subtracting the number of seller-initiated large trades from the number of buyer-
initiated large trades. The difference is then scaled by the total number of large trades for the firm 
during the sample period to allow for aggregation across firms. That is, the frequency-based 
direction measure for large trades ( itFDir ) is calculated as:
19 
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where itFBuy  and itFSell  represent the number of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated large trades 
for firm i in the half-hour interval t, respectively, and iTRD  represents the total number of large 
trades for firm i during the sample period (i.e., during 1997 and 1998). 
Second, to estimate abnormal order imbalance, we compare the direction measure around 
recommendations with its empirical distribution based on a control sample of non-event periods 
(excluding [-2, +2] days around any dividend, stock split, earnings announcements, or stock 
recommendations). The empirical distribution of ikFDir , including sample mean ( ikFDir ) and 
median ( ikMFDir ), is estimated separately for each combination of firm i and half-hour interval k 
of a trading day (k=1, ..., 13). This way, we control for trading pattern differences across firms 
and across trading time. The abnormal order imbalance (AD) for large trades in each half-hour 
interval within the event window is then calculated as: 
ikirir FDirFDirAD −= , 
                                                 
19 Replacing the number of trades with the number of shares traded yields a share-based direction measure. 
Analyses based on the share-based direction measure yield similar results. 
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where r is the rth half-hour interval relative to the event: -13, ..., +25 and k is the half-hour interval 
in a trading day (1, ..., 13) that corresponds to the rth half-hour interval.  
5.2 Univariate Analysis of Large Trade Behavior around Stock Recommendations 
In this section, we report large trade behavior around “Strong Buy,” “Buy,” and 
“Hold/Sell/Strong Sell.” Specifically, we estimate the mean abnormal order imbalance (MAD) 
for large trades in each half-hour interval around a particular type of recommendations and test 
whether it is significantly different from zero. MAD is calculated as: 
∑
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where rm  is the number of recommendations for which there was at least one large trade in the 
event period r. 
To test whether the mean abnormal order imbalance is significantly different from zero, we 
adopt a modified version of the Patell and Wolfson (1984) variance test (Normal approximation 
of a generalized form of the Binomial test). This test compares the actual measure in the event 
window with the corresponding empirical distribution in non-event periods: 
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where: 
rVM  = the actual number of observations (in the r
th half-hour interval around a 
recommendation) that exceed the corresponding distribution’s median value; 
0.5 = a correction for continuity; 
PMik = the probability that a random draw from the distribution exceeds the sample 
median; because the direction measure is discrete and multiple observations 
could take the median value, ikPM is not necessarily 0.5 and is estimated from 
the empirical distribution of FDirik.  
i, k, r = as defined above. 
 
This statistic follows the standard normal distribution. Significance tests based on the top quartile 
instead of the median are similar and are not reported for the sake of brevity. 
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Figure 1 plots the mean abnormal order imbalance of large trades around “Strong Buy.” 
Almost all the order imbalances are positive – there are more buyer-initiated than seller-initiated 
large trades. The order imbalance in the half-hour interval when the recommendation is disclosed 
and those in the thirteen intervals afterwards (except interval eight) are significant at the 0.10 
level or better. These results are consistent with institutional investors buying stocks with 
favorable recommendations. Interestingly, there are more buyer-initiated than seller-initiated 
large trades even before the recommendation is disclosed, mainly in intervals -10 to -1. Corporate 
announcements triggering the recommendation are unlikely to drive this result because we only 
include recommendations without confounding events (such as earnings announcements, 
dividend/stock split announcements, or other recommendations). Instead, the evidence is 
consistent with anecdotal evidence that brokers generally disclose recommendations to their own 
clients earlier than to First Call (Juergens [1999]; Michaely and Womack [2002]).20 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
Figure 2 plots the mean abnormal order imbalance of large trades around “Buy.” There are 
more buyer-initiated than seller-initiated large trades in many half-hour intervals, especially in 
intervals 2 to 12. Compared with Figure 1 (“Strong Buy”), the buying imbalance seems to be less 
prevalent, especially for intervals immediately around the recommendation. We formally test the 
difference between “Strong Buy” and “Buy” in the next section. 
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
Figure 3 plots the mean abnormal order imbalance of large trades around “Hold/Sell/Strong 
Sell.” In the half-hour interval when the recommendation is disclosed and in the three intervals 
afterwards, there are more seller-initiated than buyer-initiated large trades, significant at the 0.01 
level or better for all but interval one. The selling imbalance lasts until about 25 intervals after the 
                                                 
20 For example, according to The Washington Post (April 2 2000, H1), “Merrill Lynch’s Internet analyst, 
Henry Blodget, spent an afternoon updating major clients before issuing a research report on Amazon.” 
Michaely and Womack (2002) suggest that this is a common practice. Irvine et al. (2004) also find 
evidence consistent with this practice in the context of recommendation initiations. 
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recommendation, although there are also three intervals with buying imbalances in that period. 
These results are consistent with institutional investors selling stocks with unfavorable 
recommendations. Similar to the large trade behavior around “Strong Buy,” the selling imbalance 
begins as early as 11 intervals before unfavorable recommendations, consistent with brokers 
disclosing recommendations to their own clients earlier than to First Call. 
[Insert Figure 3 Here] 
In summary, the abnormal order imbalance for large trades is significantly positive around 
“Strong Buy” and significantly negative around “Hold/Sell/Strong Sell.” These results are 
consistent with our hypothesis. We also find some evidence of positive abnormal order 
imbalances around “Buy,” consistent with the abnormal return result that “Buy” in the intraday 
sample is more favorable than in the full sample, as discussed in Section 5.1.  
5.3 Regression Results 
In this section, we investigate (1) whether our intraday results hold after controlling for 
other determinants of institutional trading and (2) whether there are significant differences in 
abnormal order imbalances across recommendations. To this end, we regress the abnormal order 
imbalance (AD) in the intervals around the recommendation on recommendation indicators and 
control variables: 
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where D_SBuy (D_Buy, D_Sell) is 1 if the recommendation is “Strong Buy” (“Buy,” 
“Hold/Sell/Strong Sell”) and 0 otherwise. Control variables are the same as those used in the 
quarterly analysis and are measured in the quarter before the recommendation. As in the quarterly 
analysis, the control variables are standardized – demeaned and deflated by the sample standard 
deviation to facilitate result interpretation.  
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Coefficient β1,a (β1,b, β1,c) in regression (3) captures the average abnormal order imbalance 
in a half-hour interval around “Strong Buy” (“Buy,” “Hold/Sell/Strong Sell”). Comparing β1,a 
(β1,c) with β1,b indicates whether “Strong Buy” (“Hold/Sell/Strong Sell”) is associated with higher 
(lower) buy order imbalances than “Buy.” Because the abnormal trading is concentrated in the 
two trading days around the recommendation, as shown in the figures, we focus the regression 
analyses on the trading day before and after the recommendation (half-hour intervals [-13, -1], [0, 
+12]) and the trading day centered on the recommendation (half-hour intervals [-6, +6]).21 
Panel A of Table 5 reports the regression results when the control variables are not 
included. Consistent with our hypothesis, “Strong Buy” is associated with significantly positive 
abnormal order imbalances in each trading day. “Buy” is also associated with significantly 
positive abnormal order imbalances. Also consistent with our hypothesis, “Hold/Sell/Strong Sell” 
is associated with significantly negative abnormal order imbalances. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
The bottom of Panel A reports the differences in order imbalances between 
recommendations. The abnormal order imbalance associated with “Strong Buy” is generally 
higher than that associated with “Buy.” The difference is significant in the trading day right after 
the recommendation (p=0.082) and in the trading day centered on the recommendation (p=0.036). 
The abnormal order imbalance in each of the three trading days around “Hold/Sell/Strong Sell,” 
as predicted, is significantly lower than that around “Buy” or “Strong Buy.”  
Panel B reports the regression results with controls. The results for recommendation 
indicators and the comparisons across recommendations are similar to, although slightly weaker 
than, those reported in Panel A. With respect to control variables, most do not have significant 
coefficients in the predicted directions. 
In summary, the intraday analysis indicates that institutional investors reallocate their assets 
                                                 
21 To be consistent with Figures 1 to 3, the dependent variable is the abnormal trading imbalance in half-
hour intervals. The inferences are similar if we use the cumulated abnormal order imbalance across 
intervals as the dependent variable. 
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in response to analysts’ stock recommendations. Institutional investors buy stocks of firms with 
favorable recommendations and sell stocks of firms with unfavorable recommendations. This 
result holds after controlling for other characteristics that may affect institutional trading. 
 
6. Stock Recommendations and Institutional Investors’ Superior Performance 
The previous two sections establish that institutional investors trade upon stock 
recommendations. In this section, we investigate whether such trading helps explain institutional 
investors’ superior performance documented in prior studies. To do this, we first examine the 
correlation between institutional trading (i.e., the quarterly change in institutional ownership) and 
future abnormal stock returns as in Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Nofsinger and Sias (1999). 
A positive correlation is consistent with institutional investors outperforming the market.22 
Specifically, we use the following regression to establish the superior performance of institutional 
trades: 
ξγγγγ +++∆+=+ BPMVInstRet 32101t,i      (4a) 
Reti,t+1 is the market-adjusted abnormal returns for firm i in quarter t+1 and ∆Inst is the change in 
institutional ownership for firm i in quarter t.23 Market value (MV) and the book-to-price ratio 
(BP) are included to control for the size and book-to-market effects. Firm subscript i and quarter 
subscript t are omitted from the independent variables for simplicity.  
To investigate whether stock recommendations contribute to institutional investors’ 
superior performance, we decompose the change in institutional ownership (∆Inst) into four 
components:  
                                                 
22 This design likely underestimates the superior performance of institutional investors. If the information 
(e.g., stock recommendations) upon which institutional investors trade is revealed in the current quarter, 
institutional investors’ superior performance will be partly reflected in the positive correlation between 
institutional trading and contemporaneous stock returns (Sias et al. [2001]). However, the contemporaneous 
correlation is confounded by institutional investors’ momentum trading.  
23 We choose to examine the abnormal returns in the next quarter because we believe that the results are the 
strongest in the period right after institutional trading. Results based on a longer horizon, such as six 
months or one year, are qualitatively similar but weaker. 
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(i)  ∆InstREC – recommendation component,  
(ii)  ∆InstMomentum – momentum component,  
(iii)  ∆InstHerding – herding component, and  
(iv)  ∆InstOther – other component.  
 
Each component is the change in institutional ownership that is explained by the corresponding 
variables in equation (1): (i) stock recommendations, (ii) past and contemporaneous stock returns, 
(iii) past change in institutional ownership, and (iv) other variables. To avoid using future 
information in the decomposition, we use a roll-over approach: for quarter t, we use all the data 
up to quarter t to estimate equation (1), and use the coefficient estimates and the explanatory 
variables in quarter t to calculate the four components.24  
We then replace the total change in institutional ownership in equation (4a) with its four 
components to detect the correlation of each component with future abnormal stock returns: 
ξγγγγγγγ +++∆+∆+∆+∆+=+ BPMVInstInstInstInstRet 32Otherd,1Herdingc,1Momentumb,1RECa,101t,i  (4b) 
The coefficient on each component captures the contribution of the corresponding variables to 
institutional investors’ superior performance. Since we predict that recommendations contribute 
to institutional investors’ superior performance, γ1a is predicted to be positive. Prior research has 
demonstrated that both momentum trading and herding contribute to the ability of institutional 
investors to beat benchmarks, thus γ1b and γ1c are also expected to be positive. We do not have a 
directional prediction for the coefficient on ∆InstOther, since this component reflects institutional 
trading due to a number of considerations, such as trading for liquidity reasons.25  
Table 6 reports the results, Column (1) for regression (4a) and Column (1) for (4b). To 
facilitate comparisons between explanatory variables and to be consistent with prior research, we 
use the decile rank of each explanatory variable, which is then scaled to lie between zero and one. 
Thus, the coefficient captures the difference in future stock returns between firms in the top decile 
                                                 
24 To ensure the accuracy of coefficient estimates, we use at least five quarters’ data in estimating equation 
(1). Accordingly, the sample used for regressions (4a) and (4b) starts from the first quarter of 1995.  
25 Prior research finds that trading motivated by liquidity reasons yields under-performance. For example, 
Alexander et al. (2004) find that stocks bought (sold) by institutional investors for liquidity reasons under- 
(over-) perform the market by 1.65% (4.20%) in the following year. 
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of the corresponding explanatory variable and those in the bottom decile. As reported in Column 
(1), firms with the largest change in institutional holdings outperform firms with the smallest 
change in institutional holdings by 0.68% in the next quarter, an annualized return of 2.72%. This 
result is consistent with prior research (e.g., Nofsinger and Sias [1999]). 
Column (2) indicates that, as expected, the change in institutional ownership explained by 
stock recommendations is positively correlated with future stock returns. Firms with the largest 
change outperform those with the lowest change by 1.05% in the next quarter, an annualized 
return of 4.20%. This is consistent with stock recommendations contributing to institutional 
investors’ superior performance. The contribution of recommendations is lower than that of 
momentum trading (2.49% per quarter) but higher than that of herding (0.45% per quarter). In 
contrast, the coefficient on the other component is negative, suggesting that other factors, such as 
liquidity considerations, can lead to institutional investors’ under-performance.  
Overall, the analyses indicate that the positive correlation between institutional trading and 
future stock returns partly derives from institutional investors’ use of stock recommendations. 
Like momentum trading and herding, recommendations are an important driver of institutional 
investors’ superior performance. 
 
7. Conclusions 
We investigate whether institutional investors trade using analysts’ stock recommendations, 
and if so, whether such trading contributes to their superior performance. Since stock 
recommendations contain valuable information and institutional investors have timely access to 
these recommendations under soft-dollar arrangements, we expect institutions to change their 
holdings to profit from the recommendations. The empirical results are consistent with this 
prediction. First, using quarterly institutional holding data, we find that institutional investors 
increase (decrease) holdings of firms with (un)favorable recommendations. After controlling for a 
comprehensive set of factors that affect institutional holdings, the quarterly change in institutional 
 30
ownership is 0.90% higher for firms with favorable versus unfavorable recommendations. This 
finding is robust to a series of sensitivity tests. Furthermore, we find a negative relation between 
stock recommendations and future institutional trading, consistent with institutional investors 
reversing their trading after stock prices have incorporated information in recommendations. This 
result suggests that our finding is not driven by analysts learning from institutional trading.  
Second, using intraday data and large trades to proxy for institutional trading, we find that 
institutions initiate more buys than sells around favorable recommendations, and more sells than 
buys around unfavorable recommendations. Lastly, we find a positive correlation between the 
institutional trading that is explained by stock recommendations and future stock returns, 
suggesting that stock recommendations contribute to institutional investors’ superior 
performance. The use of stock recommendations contributes an annualized abnormal return of 
4.2%.  
Overall, we provide evidence consistent with institutional investors profiting from analysts’ 
recommendations, furthering our understanding of how institutional investors outperform 
individual investors. Our evidence also indicates that sell-side analysts’ recommendations are an 
important factor that explains institutional trading and performance. Lastly, our findings further 
our understanding of the market for analyst research and the price discovery process around stock 
recommendations. 
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APPENDIX A  
Abnormal Stock Returns Associated with Stock Recommendations  
 
The sample includes 151,848 stock recommendations issued from the first quarter of 1994 to the second quarter of 1999. For each type of 
recommendations, we first calculate the average size-adjusted return for each quarter and then report its mean across quarters and the accompanying 
time-series p-values (based on two-sided tests) in parentheses. The size-adjusted stock return in the three-day window around each recommendation  
([-1,+1]) is calculated as: 
∏ ∏+
−=
+
−=
+−+
1
1d
1
1d
size
d
i
d )r1()r1( , 
where d is the trading day relative to the recommendation day (for which d=0), rdi is the raw return of firm i on day d, and rdsize is the return of the 
corresponding CRSP size decile on day d. Size-adjusted returns in the months after the three-day window are calculated similarly. Abnormal returns 
calculated in other ways (market-adjusted, size and book-to-market adjusted, size and industry adjusted) are qualitatively similar. 
 
Stock  
Recommendations 
 
N 
Three-day Event
[-1,+1] 
1st Month 
after Event
2nd Month 
after Event 
3rd Month 
after Event 
4th Month 
after Event 
5th Month 
after Event 
6th Month 
after Event 
“Strong Buy” 45,777 1.18% 0.66% 0.11% 0.00% 0.01% -0.09% 0.00% 
  (0.001) (0.009) (0.542) (0.984) (0.961) (0.615) (0.984) 
“Buy” 45,871 0.12% 0.15% -0.02% 0.00% 0.22% -0.10% 0.00% 
  (0.015) (0.389) (0.913) (0.992) (0.221) (0.427) (0.984) 
“Hold” 54,493 -1.54% -0.27% -0.20% -0.13% 0.10% -0.17% -0.11% 
  (0.001) (0.143) (0.315) (0.504) (0.588) (0.275) (0.529) 
“Sell” 3,701 -1.07% -0.76% -0.25% -0.34% 0.06% -0.55% -0.78% 
  (0.001) (0.031) (0.643) (0.275) (0.890) (0.081) (0.035) 
“Strong Sell” 2,006 -1.46% -0.51% -0.60% -0.90% -0.66% -0.56% -0.76% 
  (0.001) (0.288) (0.204) (0.061) (0.176) (0.053) (0.110) 
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APPENDIX B  
Sample Selection Process for the Intraday Analysis 
 
 
Restrictions 
Number of 
Recommendations Left 
All recommendations in the period 1997 – 1998 a 92,118 
Recommendations are disclosed during trading hours b 50,616 
 
First Call discloses recommendations in the same half-hour interval as they 
are received from analysts c 
 
15,103 
 
No confounding recommendations – if five-day event windows ([-2, +2]) of 
two recommendations for one firm overlap, both are deleted d 
 
12,915 
No confounding events – recommendations should be at least 5 days away 
from any earnings, dividend, or stock split announcements d 
 
10,029 
 
Recommendations are for NYSE firms covered by TAQ dataset 
 
4,729 
Trade and quote data are available to estimate the direction measures e 4,322 
 
a To reduce data processing, we focus on recommendations issued in 1997 and 1998. 
b Only recommendations disclosed during trading hours (9:30 A.M. to 4:00 P.M. of a trading day) are 
included since the intraday analysis focuses on the intraday information dissemination process. 
c This restriction seeks to ensure that the recommendation time stamp accurately captures the time when 
institutional investors learn about the recommendation. 
d These restrictions are imposed to reduce the influence of confounding recommendations and events. 
e Trade/quote data satisfying the following criteria are deleted: 
- Trades/quotes stamped outside trading hours (9:30 A.M. to 4:00 P.M.); 
- Negative trades or quotes (Christie and Schultz [1994]); 
- Trades with condition codes other than regular trade and quotes with condition codes other than 
regular quote; 
- The first trade after the opening (with an opening trade condition code or without a preceding 
BBO eligible quote) – a call market is used for the opening trade; 
- Extremely large block trades (more than 3.276 million shares, as defined in Lee [1992]); 
- Trades with prices more than $5 away from the midpoint of the best displayed quote – possible 
data errors or stocks with extremely high prices (Blume and Goldstein [1997]); 
- Quotes that are originated in markets other than the exchange where the stock is listed, that is, 
only NYSE issued BBO-eligible quotes are used in the analysis (Christie and Schultz [1994]); 
- All locked or cross-quoted quotes (i.e., bid price ≥ ask price) – they are not sustainable (Christie 
and Schultz [1994]); 
- The quote price differs from the prior quote price by more than 50%, or the spread exceeds 20% of 
the midpoint of the quote ($2) when the midpoint is equal to or more than (less than) $10 – 
possible data errors (Blume and Goldstein [1997]); 
- Trades/quotes for firms with a sample average trading price outside the range [$1, $500] 
(Bhattacharya [2001]). 
 
 33
REFERENCES 
 
Alexander, G.J., G. Cici, and S. Gibson. 2004. Does motivation matter when assessing trade 
performance? An analysis of mutual funds. Working paper. University of Minnesota.  
Barber, B., R. Lehavy, M. McNichols, and B. Trueman. 2001. Can investors profit from the 
prophets? Security analyst recommendations and stock returns. The Journal of Finance 56 
(2): 531-63. 
Barclay, M.J., C.G. Dunbar, and J.B. Warner. 1993. Stealth and volatility: Which trades move 
prices? Journal of Financial Economics 34 (3): 281-306. 
Belsley, D.A., E. Kuh, and R.E. Welsch. 1980. Regression Diagnostics: Identifying Influential 
Data and Sources of Collinearity. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons. 
Bennett, J., R. Sias, and L. Starks. 2003. Greener pastures and the impact of dynamic institutional 
preferences. Review of Financial Studies 16 (4): 1203-38. 
Benson, M. and C. Bryan-Low. 2002. Dynegy is touted by Wall Street analysts even as troubles 
mount. Wall Street Journal. May 9. 
Bhattacharya, N. 2001. Investors’ trade size and trading responses around earnings 
announcements: An empirical investigation. The Accounting Review 76 (2): 221-44. 
Blume, M. 1993. Soft dollars and the brokerage industry. Financial Analysts Journal 
(March/April): 36-44. 
Blume, M. and M. Goldstein. 1997. Quotes, order flow, and price discovery. The Journal of 
Finance 52 (1): 221-44.  
Boni, L. and K.L. Womack. 2002. Solving the sell-side research problem: Insights from buy-side 
professionals. Working paper. University of New Mexico.  
Chakravarty, S. 2001. Stealth-trading: Which traders’ trades move stock prices? Journal of 
Financial Economics 61 (2): 289-307. 
Chan, L. and J. Lakonishok. 1993. Institutional trades and intraday stock price behavior. Journal 
of Financial Economics 33 (2): 173-99. 
Chen, H., N. Jegadeesh, and R.Wermers. 2000. The value of active mutual fund management: An 
examination of the stockholdings and trades of fund managers. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 35 (3): 343-68.  
Chen, J., H. Hong, and J. Stein. 2002. Breadth of ownership and stock returns. Journal of 
Financial Economics 66 (2-3): 171-205. 
Christie, W. and P. Schultz. 1994. Why do NASDAQ market-makers avoid odd-eighth quotes? 
The Journal of Finance 49 (5): 1813-40. 
Conrad, J.S., K.M. Johnson, and S. Wahal. 2001. Institutional trading and soft dollars. The 
Journal of Finance 56 (1): 397-416. 
 34
Fama, E.F. and J. MacBeth. 1973. Risk, return and equilibrium: Empirical tests. Journal of 
Political Economy 81 (3): 607-36. 
Gompers, P. and A. Metrick. 2001. Institutional investors and equity prices. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 116 (1): 229-59.  
Grinblatt, M., S. Titman, and R. Wermers. 1995. Momentum investment strategies, portfolio 
performance, and herding: A study of mutual fund behavior. American Economic Review 
85 (5): 1088-1105. 
Grossman, S.J. and J.E. Stiglitz. 1980. On the impossibility of informationally efficient markets. 
American Economic Review 70 (3): 393-408. 
Irvine, P., M. Lipson, and A. Puckett. 2004. Tipping. Working paper. University of Georgia.  
Jegadeesh, N., J. Kim, S.D. Krische, and C.M.C. Lee. 2004. Analyzing the analysts: When do 
recommendations add value? The Journal of Finance 59 (3): 1083-1124. 
Juergens, J.L. 1999. How do stock market process analysts’ recommendations? An intra-daily 
analysis. Working paper. Penn State University. 
Lakonishok, J., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 1992. The impact of institutional trading on stock 
prices. Journal of Financial Economics 32 (1): 23-43.  
Lee, C.M.C. 1992. Earnings news and small trades: An intraday analysis. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics 15 (2-3): 265-302. 
Lee, C.M.C. and M. Ready. 1991. Inferring trade direction from intraday data. The Journal of 
Finance 46 (2): 733-46.  
Michaely, R. and K.L. Womack. 2002. Brokerage recommendations: Stylized characteristics, 
market responses, and biases. Working paper. Cornell University. Prepared for Advances in 
Behavioral Finance II edited by Richard Thaler. 
Nofsinger, J. and R. Sias. 1999. Herding and feedback trading by institutional and individual 
investors. The Journal of Finance 54 (6): 2263-95.  
Odders-White, E. 2000. On the occurrence and consequences of inaccurate trade classification. 
Journal of Financial Markets 3: 259-86.  
Odean, T. 1999. Do investors trade too much? American Economic Review 89 (5): 1279-98.  
Patell, J.M. and M.A. Wolfson. 1984. The intraday speed of adjustment of stock prices to 
earnings and dividend announcements. Journal of Financial Economics 13 (2): 223-52. 
Securities and Exchange Commission. 1998. Inspection report on the soft dollar practices of 
broker-dealers, investment advisers and mutual funds. 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/softdolr.htm. 
Sias, R. 2004. Institutional herding. Review of Financial Studies 17 (1): 165-206. 
 35
Sias, R., L. Starks, and S. Titman. 2001. The Price impact of institutional trading. Working paper. 
University of Texas and Washington State University. 
Wermers, R. 1999. Mutual fund herding and the impact on stock prices. The Journal of Finance 
54 (2): 581-622.  
Womack, K.L. 1996. Do brokerage analysts’ recommendations have investment value? The 
Journal of Finance 51 (1): 137-67. 
 
 36
TABLE 1  Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations 
 
The sample includes 67,230 firm-quarters from the first quarter of 1994 to the second quarter of 1999. All 
the descriptive statistics are averages across the 22 quarters. Subscript i represents firm i and subscript t 
represents quarter t.  
 
Panel A: Institutional Holdings and Trading 
Insti,t = institutional ownership at the end of quarter t for firm i. 
∆Insti,t = change in institutional ownership from the beginning to the end of quarter t for firm i.  
 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile 
Insti,t 41.48% 23.05% 21.90% 40.78% 59.90% 
∆Insti,t 0.23% 4.28% -1.24% 0.13% 1.65% 
 
Panel B: Consensus Stock Recommendations 
RECi,t = consensus stock recommendations, calculated as the mean of stock recommendations issued 
in quarter t for firm i, with 5 standing for “Strong Buy,” 4 for “Buy,” and 3 for “Hold,” 
“Sell,” or “Strong Sell.” RECi,t is available for 44,675 firm-quarters.  
D_SBuyi,t = 1 if RECi,t falls into the top 33% in quarter t and 0 otherwise. 
D_Buyi,t = 1 if RECi,t falls into the middle 33% in quarter t and 0 otherwise.  
D_Selli,t = 1 if RECi,t falls into the bottom 34% in quarter t and 0 otherwise. 
 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile 
RECi,t 3.82 0.69 3 4 4 
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TABLE 1  (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Control Variables 
 
Institutional preferences 
∆Betai,t , ∆Stdevi,t , ∆Riski,t , ∆Dividend_yieldi,t , and ∆Liquidityi,t are changes in the corresponding variables 
from quarter t-1 to quarter t. 
Betai,t  = the sum of the coefficients in a regression of firm i’s monthly return on the 
contemporaneous and previous month’ CRSP value-weighted index over the 60 
months prior to the end of quarter t. 
Stdevi,t  = the standard deviation of firm i’s daily return in quarter t.  
Riski,t  = the average monthly estimate of firm-specific risk in quarter t, with the monthly 
estimate generated as the squared difference between daily firm returns and 
associated daily industry returns summed each month. 
Dividend_yieldi,t  = the average annual dividend yield over the 12 months prior to the end of quarter t. 
Liquidityi,t  = the average of the ratio of daily trading volume, divided by two if firm i is traded 
on NASDAQ, to number of shares outstanding in quarter t. 
Momentum trading 
Reti,t  = market-adjusted stock return in quarter t. 
Lag(Ret) i,t = market-adjusted stock return in quarter t-1. 
Forecast_revisioni,t = the latest consensus EPS forecast in quarter t for the next fiscal year, minus the 
latest consensus EPS forecast prior to quarter t for the same fiscal year, then 
divided by the stock price at the end of quarter t. 
Herding 
Lag(∆Inst) i,t = change in institutional ownership from the beginning to the end of quarter t-1. 
Value/Glamour trading 
For EPi,t, BPi,t, and Sales_growthi,t, the previous fiscal quarter refers to the most recent fiscal quarter whose 
quarter end falls before the beginning of calendar quarter t, such that its financial information is available 
during calendar quarter t.  
EPi,t  = the sum of income before extraordinary items of the previous four fiscal quarters 
divided by market value at the end of quarter t. 
BPi,t  = book value of common equity of the previous fiscal quarter divided by market 
value at the end of quarter t. 
Sales_growthi,t  = the sum of sales of the previous four fiscal quarters divided by the sum of sales of 
the previous five to eight fiscal quarters, minus one. 
 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile 
Institutional preferences 
∆Betai,t -0.02 0.31 -0.17 -0.02 0.13 
∆Stdevi,t 0.05% 1.05% -0.42% 0.02% 0.47% 
∆Riski,t 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 
∆Dividend_yieldi,t 0.00% 0.22% -0.02% 0.00% 0.02% 
∆Liquidityi,t 0.00% 0.21% -0.06% 0.00% 0.06% 
Momentum trading 
Reti,t 0.17% 20.84% -11.74% -1.15% 10.18% 
Lag(Ret) i,t 0.08% 20.32% -11.60% -1.11% 10.04% 
Forecast_revisioni,t -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Herding 
Lag(∆Inst) i,t 0.40% 4.24% -1.12% 0.19% 1.74% 
Value/Glamour trading 
EPi,t 0.02 0.17 0.02 0.05 0.07 
BPi,t 0.59 0.51 0.30 0.49 0.73 
Sales_growthi,t 0.20 0.38 0.03 0.12 0.28 
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TABLE 1  (Continued) 
 
Panel D: Pearson Correlations 
All the correlations are based on 67,230 firm-quarters, except those between REC and other variables which are based on the 44,675 firm-quarters with 
recommendation data. We first estimate the correlations for each quarter and then present the time-series averages of the 22 quarterly correlations. The 
significance level is based on the associated time-series standard deviations (Fama and MacBeth 1973). All correlations are significant at the 0.10 level 
or better based on two-sided tests, except those with “#”. See panels A, B, and C for variable measurement. Firm subscript i and quarter subscript t are 
omitted for simplicity. 
 
 ∆Inst REC ∆Beta ∆Stdev ∆Risk 
∆Dividend_
yield ∆Liquidity Ret Lag(Ret)
Forecast_
revision Lag(∆Inst) EP BP 
REC 0.13             
∆Beta 0.05 0.02#            
∆Stdev -0.10 -0.04 0.05           
∆Risk -0.09 -0.04 0.04 0.89          
∆Dividend_yield -0.01 -0.01# -0.01# 0.01# 0.00#         
∆Liquidity 0.01# 0.01 0.05 0.39 0.33 0.00#        
Ret 0.27 0.13 0.16# -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 0.14       
Lag(Ret) 0.17 0.10 0.01# -0.12 -0.12 -0.07 0.05 0.02#      
Forecast_revision 0.14 0.14 0.03# -0.10 -0.11 -0.01 0.03 0.23 0.24     
Lag(∆Inst) 0.10 0.11 -0.01# 0.07 0.05 -0.01 0.08 0.00# 0.30 0.11    
EP 0.04 0.05 0.00# -0.07 -0.10 0.04 0.01# 0.08 0.11 0.27 0.04   
BP -0.13 -0.16 -0.01# 0.06 0.08 0.03 -0.03 -0.23 -0.20 -0.25 -0.11 -0.17  
Sales_growth 0.04 0.16 -0.02# 0.01# 0.00# 0.01# -0.01# -0.01# 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.04 -0.15 
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TABLE 2  Regressions of Changes in Institutional Ownership on  
Consensus Stock Recommendations and Control Variables 
 
This table reports results from the following regression: 
εβββ
ββββ
βββββ
ββββ
++++
∆++++
∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+
+++=∆
growthSalesBPEP
InstLagrevisionForecasttLag(RetRe
LiquidityyieldDividendRiskStdevBeta
SellDBuyDSBuyDInst cba
_
)(_)
_
___
131211
10987
65432
,1,1,10
 (1) 
Firm subscript i and quarter subscript t are omitted for simplicity. The sample includes 67,230 firm-quarters 
from the first quarter of 1994 to the second quarter of 1999. See Table 1 for variable measurement. To 
facilitate comparisons, all the control variables are standardized – demeaned and then deflated by the 
standard deviation within the quarter. Panel A (B) reports the average coefficients (differences in 
coefficients) from quarterly regressions and the associated time-series p-values in parentheses (Fama and 
MacBeth 1973). The p-values are based on one-sided tests for variables with directional predictions and on 
two-sided tests otherwise.  
Panel A: Regression Results 
  Predicted signs (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept  ? 0.0011 0.0019 0.0019 0.0019 
   (0.196) (0.026) (0.022) (0.024) 
Recommendation indicators  
D_SBuy  + 0.0100 0.0052 0.0051 0.0051 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
D_Buy  * 0.0018 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 
   (0.068) (0.625) (0.712) (0.665) 
D_Sell  – -0.0063 -0.0039 -0.0040 -0.0039 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Control variables       
∆Beta  –  0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 
    (0.890) (0.859) (0.891) 
∆Stdev  –  -0.0029  -0.0033 
    (0.001)  (0.001) 
∆Risk  –   -0.0024 0.0004 
     (0.001) (0.720) 
∆Dividend_yield  +  0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
∆Liquidity  +  -0.0007 -0.0010 -0.0006 
    (0.864) (0.961) (0.853) 
Ret  +  0.0106 0.0107 0.0107 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Lag(Ret)  +  0.0053 0.0054 0.0052 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Forecast_revision  +  0.0013 0.0013 0.0012 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Lag(∆Inst)  +  0.0026 0.0025 0.0026 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
EP  –  -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0009 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
BP  –  -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0009 
    (0.010) (0.014) (0.012) 
Sales_growth  +  0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Average Adj. R2   0.018 0.127 0.127 0.128 
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TABLE 2  (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Comparisons across Recommendations 
  
Predicted 
signs (1) (2) (3) (4) 
D_SBuy −D_Buy  + 0.0081 0.0048 0.0048 0.0047 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
D_Sell −D_Buy  – -0.0082 -0.0043 -0.0043 -0.0043 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
D_ SBuy −D_ Sell  + 0.0163 0.0091 0.0091 0.0090 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
* The coefficient on D_Buy is expected to be less than that on D_SBuy and greater than that on D_Sell. 
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TABLE 3  Regressions of Changes in Institutional Ownership on 
Current and Lagged Consensus Stock Recommendations and Control Variables 
 
This table reports results from the following regression: 
εβββ
ββββ
βββββ
ββββ
ββββββ
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8,8,17,7,16,6,15,5,1
4,4,13,3,12,2,11,1,1,0,10
 (2) 
Firm subscript i and quarter subscript t are omitted from all the variables (except recommendation 
variables) for simplicity. The sample includes 11,371 firm-quarters with required recommendation data 
from the first quarter of 1996 to the second quarter of 1999. RECi,t-s is the consensus recommendation in 
quarter t-s for firm i. See Table 1 for definitions of other variables. To facilitate comparisons, all the control 
variables are standardized – demeaned and then deflated by the standard deviation within the quarter. The 
table reports the average coefficients (or sum of coefficients) from quarterly regressions and the associated 
time-series p-values in parentheses (Fama and MacBeth 1973). The p-values are based on one-sided tests 
for variables with directional predictions and on two-sided tests otherwise.   
 
Predicted 
signs   
Predicted  
signs  
Intercept ? 0.0026 Control variables   
  (0.631)    
 ∆Beta – 0.0010 
Consensus recommendations   (0.824) 
RECi,t + 0.0056 ∆Stdev – -0.0012 
  (0.001)   (0.128) 
RECi,t-1 * 0.0002 ∆Risk – -0.0021 
  (0.821)   (0.042) 
RECi,t-2 * -0.0002 ∆Dividend_yield + 0.0016 
  (0.727)   (0.001) 
RECi,t-3 * -0.0014 ∆Liquidity + -0.0016 
  (0.027)   (0.971) 
RECi,t-4 * -0.0020 Ret + 0.0145 
  (0.026)   (0.001) 
RECi,t-5 * -0.0012 Lag(Ret) + 0.0055 
  (0.061)   (0.001) 
RECi,t-6 * -0.0010 Forecast_revision + 0.0030 
  (0.099)   (0.001) 
RECi,t-7 * -0.0000 Lag(∆Inst) + 0.0027 
  (0.944)   (0.003) 
RECi,t-8 * 0.0002 EP – -0.0011 
  (0.785)   (0.020) 
   BP – 0.0010 
Sum of coefficients on recommendation variables   (0.894) 
RECi,t-1 + ... +RECi,t-8 – -0.0054 Sales_growth + 0.0007 
  (0.001)   (0.128) 
RECi,t + ... +RECi,t-8 ? 0.0002    
  (0.998) Average Adj. R2  0.197 
 
* While we do not have directional predictions for individual lagged recommendations, we expect the sum 
of their coefficients to be negative. 
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TABLE 4  Additional Analyses by Institution Type, Firm Size, and Institution’s Trading Decision 
 
This table reports results from three additional analyses. The full sample includes 67,230 firm-quarters 
from the first quarter of 1994 to the second quarter of 1999. See Table 1 for variable measurement. To 
facilitate comparisons, all control variables are standardized – demeaned and then deflated by the standard 
deviation within the quarter. The regressions are run quarterly. For each analysis, we report the average 
differences in coefficients across recommendations and the associated time-series p-values in parentheses 
(Fama and MacBeth 1973). The p-values are based on one-sided tests. 
 
Panel A: Regressions of Changes in Institutional Ownership on Consensus Stock Recommendations and 
Control Variables by Institution Type 
The regression is as follows:  
εβββ
ββββ
βββββ
ββββ
++++
∆++++
∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+
+++=∆ =
growthSalesBPEP
InstLagrevisionForecastetLag(RetR
LiquidityyieldDividendRiskStdevBeta
SellDBuyDSBuyDInst cbajtype
_
)(_)
_
___
131211
10987
65432
,1,1,10
, (1′) 
where ∆Insttype=j is the change in the fraction of a firm’s shares held by type j institutional investors. Firm 
subscript i and quarter subscript t are omitted for simplicity.  
 
 
Predicted 
Signs 
(1) 
 
Bank 
(2) 
Insurance 
Company 
(3) 
Investment 
Company 
(4) 
Investment 
Advisor  
(5) 
 
Other 
N  65,761 59,712 52,884 67,052  56,696 
D_SBuy −D_Buy + 0.0011 0.0006 0.0011 0.0015  0.0004 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.002)  (0.026) 
D_Sell −D_Buy – -0.0010 -0.0005 -0.0010 -0.0011  -0.0005 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.011) (0.001)  (0.021) 
D_ SBuy −D_ Sell + 0.0021 0.0011 0.0021 0.0026  0.0009 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.003) 
 
Panel B: Regressions of Changes in Institutional Ownership on Consensus Stock Recommendations and 
Control Variables by Firm Size  
We split the sample into three size-based groups. The regression is as follows: 
εβββ
ββββ
βββββ
ββββ
++++
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+++=∆
growthSalesBPEP
InstLagrevisionForecasttLag(RetRe
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  (1) 
Firm subscript i and quarter subscript t are omitted for simplicity.  
 Predicted 
signs 
(1) 
Small Firms 
(2)  
Medium Firms 
(3)  
Large Firms 
N  24,688 17,272 25,270 
D_SBuy −D_Buy + 0.0064 0.0042 0.0036 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
D_Sell−D_Buy – -0.0019 -0.0076 -0.0030 
  (0.088) (0.001) (0.001) 
D_ SBuy −D_ Sell + 0.0083 0.0118 0.0066 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
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TABLE 4  (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Regressions of Entry, Exit, Adjustment of Holdings on Consensus Stock Recommendations and 
Control Variables  
 
The regression is as follows: 
εββββ
βββββ
βββββ
ββββ
+++++
+++++
∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+
+++=
growthSalesBPEPAdjustmentLag
ExitLagEntryLagrevisionForecasttLag(RetRe
LiquidityyieldDividendRiskStdevBeta
SellDBuyDSBuyDAdjustmentExitEntry
c
ba
cba
_)(
)()(_)
_
___,
131211,10
,10,10987
65432
,1,1,10,
,  (1′′) 
where Entry  is the fraction of a firm’s shares bought in the quarter by institutional investors who enter, i.e., 
those who do not hold any shares in the firm at the beginning of the quarter; Exit is the fraction of a firm’s 
shares sold in the quarter by institutional investors who exit, i.e., those who sell all of their holdings of the 
firm; Adjustment is the change in the fraction of a firm’s shares held by institutional investors who hold the 
firm’s shares at both the beginning and the end of the quarter. Firm subscript i and quarter subscript t are 
omitted for simplicity. 
  
 Predicted  
signs 
(1)  
Entry 
(2)  
Exit 
(3) 
 Adjustment 
N  67,230 67,230 67,230 
D_SBuy −D_Buy + 0.0023 0.0009 0.0012 
  (0.001) (0.057) (0.004) 
D_Sell −D_Buy – -0.0023 -0.0004 -0.0016 
  (0.001) (0.198) (0.001) 
D_ SBuy −D_ Sell + 0.0046 0.0013 0.0028 
  (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) 
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TABLE 5  Regressions of Abnormal Order Imbalance on  
Stock Recommendations and Control Variables 
 
This table reports results from the following regression: 
εβββ
ββββ
βββββ
βββ
++++
∆++++
∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+
++=
−
−
−
−−−
growthSalesBPEP
)Inst(LagrevisionForecast)tLag(RetRe
LiquidityyieldDividendRiskStdevBeta
SellDBuyDSBuyDAD
131211
10987
65432
c,1b,1a,1
  (3) 
The abnormal order imbalance (AD) is calculated as the difference between the trading direction measure 
and its average over the non-event period. The trading direction measure for each half-hour interval is 
calculated by subtracting the number of seller-initiated large trades from the number of buyer-initiated large 
trades and then dividing the difference by the total number of large trades for the firm during the sample 
period. D_SBuy (D_Buy, D_Sell) is 1 if the recommendation is “Strong Buy” (“Buy,” “Hold/Sell/Strong 
Sell”) and 0 otherwise. Control variables are defined in Table 1 and are measured in the quarter before the 
recommendation. To facilitate comparisons, all the control variables are standardized – demeaned and then 
deflated by the sample standard deviation. 
The analyses are based on 1,533 “Strong Buy,” 1,306 “Buy,” and 1,483 “Hold/Sell/Strong Sell” issued in 
the period 1997-1998. The table reports the regression results using the following three sets of half-hour 
intervals around recommendations: [-13,-1], [0,12], and [-6,6]. The p-values are based on one-sided tests 
for variables with directional predictions and on two-sided tests otherwise.   
 
Panel A: Regression Results without Controls  
 
Predicted 
sign 
Intervals 
[-13, -1] 
Intervals 
[0, 12] 
Intervals 
[-6, 6] 
D_SBuy + 0.0011 0.0017 0.0017 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
D_Buy * 0.0007 0.0012 0.0010 
  (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) 
D_Sell – -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0005 
  (0.018) (0.004) (0.017) 
 
N  38,592 39,303 39,202 
Adj. R2 (%)  0.075 0.168 0.134 
 
Comparisons across Recommendations 
D_SBuy −D_Buy + 0.0004 0.0005 0.0007 
  (0.144) (0.082) (0.036) 
D_Sell−D_Buy – -0.0012 -0.0019 -0.0015 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
D_ SBuy −D_ Sell + 0.0016 0.0024 0.0022 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
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TABLE 5  (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Multiple Regression Results  
 
Predicted 
sign 
Intervals 
[-13, -1] 
Intervals 
[0, 12] 
Intervals 
[-6, 6] 
Recommendation indicators 
D_SBuy  + 0.0010 0.0014 0.0015 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
D_Buy * 0.0008 0.0011 0.0009 
  (0.006) (0.001) (0.003) 
D_Sell – -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0005 
  (0.107) (0.066) (0.046) 
Control variables 
∆Beta – 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.528) (0.644) (0.520) 
∆Stdev – -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0000 
  (0.239) (0.334) (0.571) 
∆Risk – 0.0011 0.0004 0.0007 
  (0.996) (0.808) (0.943) 
∆Dividend_yield + -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0001 
  (0.998) (0.813) (0.606) 
∆Liquidity + -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 
  (0.770) (0.871) (0.862) 
Ret + -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0006 
  (0.996) (1.000) (1.000) 
Lag(Ret) + 0.0005 0.0002 0.0003 
  (0.004) (0.111) (0.038) 
Forecast_revision + 0.0005 -0.0003 0.0001 
  (0.002) (0.908) (0.261) 
Lag(∆Inst) + -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0003 
  (0.873) (0.560) (0.916) 
EP – -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0008 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
BP – 0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0001 
  (0.875) (0.001) (0.312) 
Sales_growth + 0.0001 0.0004 0.0002 
  (0.298) (0.009) (0.179) 
 
N  30,878 31,261 31,282 
Adj. R2 (%)  0.236 0.275 0.266 
 
Comparisons across Recommendations 
D_SBuy −D_Buy + 0.0002 0.0003 0.0006 
  (0.368) (0.222) (0.074) 
D_Sell−D_Buy – -0.0011 -0.0015 -0.0014 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
D_ SBuy −D_ Sell + 0.0013 0.0018 0.0020 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
* The coefficient on D_Buy is expected to be less than that on D_SBuy and greater than that on D_Sell. 
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TABLE 6  Stock Recommendations and Institutional Investors’ Superior Performance 
 
This table reports results from the following regressions: 
ξγγγγ +++∆+=+ BPMVInstRet 32101t,i     (4a) 
ξγγγγγγγ +++∆+∆+∆+∆+=+ BPMVInstInstInstInstRet 32Otherd,1Herdingc,1Momentumb,1RECa,101t,i  (4b) 
For simplicity, firm subscript i and quarter subscript t are omitted from variables except Reti,t+1. Reti,t+1 is 
the market-adjusted stock return for firm i in quarter t+1. MV is market value at the end of quarter t. ∆Inst 
and BP are defined in Table 1. In regression (4b), ∆Inst is decomposed into four parts: ∆InstREC, 
∆InstMomentum, ∆InstHerding, and ∆InstOther, representing institutional trading that is explained by stock 
recommendations, by momentum trading, by herding, and by other factors, respectively. Specifically,   
HerdingMomentumRECOther
10Herding
87Momentum
c,1b,1a,1REC
InstInstInstInstInst
)Inst(LagInst
)tLag(RetReInst
SellDBuyDSBuyDInst
∆−∆−∆−∆=∆
∆=∆
+=∆
++=∆ −−−
β
ββ
βββ
, 
where the coefficients are estimated from equation (1): 
εβββ
ββββ
βββββ
ββββ
++++
∆++++
∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+
+++=∆
growthSalesBPEP
InstLagrevisionForecasttLag(RetRe
LiquidityyieldDividendRiskStdevBeta
SellDBuyDSBuyDInst cba
_
)(_)
_
___
131211
10987
65432
,1,1,10
       (1) 
For each quarter t (starting from the first quarter of 1995), we estimate regression (1) using all the firm-
quarters up to quarter t. We use the coefficient estimates and the explanatory variables in quarter t to 
decompose ∆Inst. 
The table reports the average coefficients from quarterly regressions of (4a) and (4b) and the associated 
time-series p-values in parentheses (Fama and MacBeth 1973). The p-values are based on one-sided tests 
for variables with directional predictions and on two-sided tests otherwise. To facilitate comparisons 
between explanatory variables, we use the decile rank of each explanatory variable, which is then scaled to 
lie between zero and one. The regressions are based on 56,131 firm-quarters from the first quarter of 1995 
to the second quarter of 1999.  
  Predicted signs (1) (2) 
Intercept  ? -0.0059 -0.0262 
   (0.688) (0.124) 
∆Inst  + 0.0068  
   (0.052)  
∆InstREC  +  0.0105 
    (0.024) 
∆InstMomentum  +  0.0249 
    (0.058) 
∆InstHerding  +  0.0045 
    (0.111) 
∆InstOther  ?  -0.0113 
    (0.004) 
MV  – 0.0174 0.0153 
   (0.826) (0.798) 
BP  + 0.0029 0.0087 
   (0.374) (0.324) 
Average Adj. R2   0.022 0.028 
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FIGURE 1  Mean Abnormal Order Imbalance of Large Trades around “Strong Buy”  
 
The analyses are based on 1,533 “Strong Buy” issued in the period 1997-1998. The number of recommendations used in each interval ranges from 835 
to 930. The trading direction measure for each half-hour interval surrounding a recommendation (-13 to +25) is calculated by subtracting the number of 
seller-initiated large trades from the number of buyer-initiated large trades. The difference is then scaled by the total number of large trades for the firm 
during the sample period. The mean abnormal order imbalance in each half-hour interval within the event window is calculated by comparing the 
direction measure with its average over the non-event period. Significance tests are based on median comparisons. 
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FIGURE 2  Mean Abnormal Order Imbalance of Large Trades around “Buy”  
 
The analyses are based on 1,306 “Buy” issued in the period 1997-1998. The number of recommendations used in each interval ranges from 723 to 826. 
The trading direction measure for each half-hour interval surrounding a recommendation (-13 to +25) is calculated by subtracting the number of seller-
initiated large trades from the number of buyer-initiated large trades. The difference is then scaled by the total number of large trades for the firm during 
the sample period. The mean abnormal order imbalance in each half-hour interval within the event window is calculated by comparing the direction 
measure with its average over the non-event period. Significance tests are based on median comparisons. 
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FIGURE 3  Mean Abnormal Order Imbalance of Large Trades around “Hold/Sell/Strong Sell”  
 
The analyses are based on 1,483 “Hold/Sell/Strong Sell” issued in the period 1997-1998. The number of recommendations used in each interval ranges 
from 895 to 991. The trading direction measure for each half-hour interval surrounding a recommendation (-13 to +25) is calculated by subtracting the 
number of seller-initiated large trades from the number of buyer-initiated large trades. The difference is then scaled by the total number of large trades 
for the firm during the sample period. The mean abnormal order imbalance in each half-hour interval within the event window is calculated by 
comparing the direction measure with its average over the non-event period. Significance tests are based on median comparisons. 
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